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UNTANGLING JURISDICTION AND CONTRACT SCOPE
ISSUES WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators often have difficulty dealing with copyright
license cases due to tangled questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. Not
only are courts split over which cases "arise under" federal copyright law,
but the issues are further muddled by federal policy preempting state con-
tract law in ways that are difficult to predict. This comment recommends an
approach that is more consistent with both governing statutes and policies
underlying pertinent case law.
Congress granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases
that arise under copyright law through 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)., Although the
statute's language indicates that Congress did not intend to completely pre-
clude states from handling intellectual property issues, the line between fed-
eral and state jurisdiction remains unclear, as does the question of which
jurisdiction's law is applicable.
This comment suggests that the best reading of the law supports a pol-
icy of split sovereignty that would enable different systems to govern the
specialized areas that they are designed to regulate. Essentially, the prob-
lems surrounding procedural issues in copyright licensing cases should be
clarified in two ways: (1) exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338 should
be governed solely by the well-pleaded complaint rule;' and (2) interpreting
courts should use federal copyright law to decide whether a license covers a
right and state contract law to interpret the license. Part II of this comment
discusses the statutes and case law pertaining to jurisdiction and choice of
law questions in the intellectual property context, while Part I suggests
how the law should be interpreted and how to implement that suggestion.
Finally, this comment concludes in Part IV with a brief discussion of the
benefits of the recommended approach.
1. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protec-
tion and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
2. The grant of jurisdiction under § 1331 may be broader, as is discussed infra Part
III.A. 1.
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II. BACKGROUND - THE LAW AS IT STANDS
The ordinary mental pathway taken in litigation requires consideration of
jurisdictional issues before substantive issues. In the copyright context,
however, the substantive law is so interwoven with jurisdiction that it is
helpful to understand substantive copyright and contract licensing law prior
to delving into jurisdictional questions. Once the merits of copyright and
contract law are explained, this comment will then discuss jurisdictional
approaches premised on substantive determinations.
A. The Merits
1. Copyright Law
The Constitution grants Congress the power to make laws governing
copyrights in order to protect creativity and progress.3 Congress passed the
first copyright law in 1790.' The most recent overhaul of copyright law was
the Copyright Act of 1976' ("Copyright Act" or "Act"); since its passage,
Congress has made only relatively minor changes.
Under current law, a copyright is a temporary right granted to an author
to protect a novel expression set out in a tangible medium. 6 Copyrights are
not given for ideas or laws of nature, but instead for an embodiment of some
act of creativity.7 Receipt of a copyright in the United States requires a
copyrightable subject matter, such as a book, movie, computer program,
musical performance, or architectural work. 8 The fight is granted to the au-
thor(s) of the work.9 The duration of the copyright depends on either when
the work was published or when it originated.1 °
A copyright grants several rights: (1) reproduction, (2) adaptation, (3)
publication, (4) performance, (5) display, and (6) anti-circumvention (if
applicable).1 "Moral rights," which were added to United States law solely
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World: Providing Federal
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 48 (2009);
See 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
5. Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2006).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102; See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
9. Id. § 201.
10. Id. § 302.
11. The first five rights are covered in 17 U.S.C. § 106. The final right is granted by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and it applies to works that are secured by tech-
nological protection measures. Id. § 512.
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to meet the dictates of the Berne Convention, 12 are theoretically protected,
and they include the right to attribution and the right of integrity. 3
The 1976 changes to copyright law removed all formality requirements
for creating a copyright. 14 In order to enforce any right, however, a copy-
right holder must first register the copyright. 5 If a copyright is registered
after copyright infringement has occurred, a copyright holder may sue for
actual damages and injunctive relief.'6 Registration prior to infringement
confers additional advantages, including the possibility of receiving both
statutory damages and attorney's fees."
The bedrock policy underlying U.S. copyright law is the desire to strike
a balance between encouraging creativity in useful works and giving the
public access to those creations. 8 One way that courts have traditionally
encouraged authors is by advancing a policy that favors copyright owners
when interpreting attempts to alienate authors' rights. 9 The general rule is
copyright owners keep what they do not explicitly alienate.2"
A traditional copyright example is the publication of a book.2' Consider
the following scenario: Pat Author writes a novel. Pat knows it is a good
idea to have a work copyrighted, so she fills out the requisite forms and
sends them, along with a couple copies of her work, to the Copyright Office.
12. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6 his,
July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
14. Id. § 408(a). In order to conform to the Berne Treaty's requirement that a copyright
springs into existence with the creation of the work, Congress removed the "formality" re-
quirements of registration, deposit, and notice. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
15. Id. § 412. Moral rights are an exception to this requirement. Id. § 106A.
16. Id. §§ 412,502-504.
17. Id. §§ 412, 504-505. Statutory damages are sometimes preferable to actual damages
as the standard of proof with regard to damages is lower, See, e.g., Frank Music Corp. v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1985), and the plaintiff is able
to decide which damage model to follow at any point "before final judgment is rendered." 17
U.S.C. § 504(b)-(c)(1). See generally Andrew Berger, Statutory Damages in Copyright Liti-
gation, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 30 (discussing statutory damages in copyright in-
fringement cases). Attorney's fees are, of course, a strong incentive for many, not the least of
whom are attorneys.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is
Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that
should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to
their work product.")
19. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988)) ("Chief among [the
purposes underlying federal copyright law] is the protection of the author's rights.").
20. Id. (citing Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853; 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)) ("[C]opyright licenses are
assumed to prohibit any use not authorized.").
21. Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1065 (1998).
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A few months later, Pat gets a lucky break and lands a good agent, Joe
Agent. Joe works tirelessly to sell the novel, and after about six months,
Sarah Editor agrees to publish it. The novel hits the shelves six months later
to great fanfare, the money starts rolling in, and everything seems to be pro-
ceeding smoothly for Pat.
Although Pat may not be worried at this point, various copyright in-
fringements can occur or become discovered at any moment. For instance,
maybe Pat did not reveal that she copied part of the work from a friend.
Maybe Joe sold the rights to the movie without Pat's consent. Maybe Sarah
only had rights to publish the first edition, but she later published a second
edition as well. Maybe someone has circumvented the Digital Rights Man-
agement software, made a digital copy, and published it online. Maybe a
website devoted to the story has begun publishing fan fiction, possibly from
anonymous posters. Maybe news blogs have picked up the story, and teach-
ers have begun printing excerpts for intellectual property discussions. Each
of these examples constitutes an infringement of Pat's copyright for which
the law provides possible remedies.22 Pat will soon be glad she registered.
It is also possible that Pat will write another book, but would prefer to
have someone else handle the copyright headaches. One important aspect of
copyrights is that they are alienable. In other words, an author can sell the
rights to her work to an individual or company, and in so doing, deliver all
of her exclusive rights to the buyer. 4 If the author wants to limit some other
entity to use of the copyrighted material, however, she may simply license
the work.25
2. Licenses and Contract Interpretation
Licenses are contracts designed to allow a licensee the right to use
property, but do not transfer title to the property. 6 Of course, to create a
22. The fair use doctrine would likely provide a defense against the last two examples of
infringement in this scenario. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed
by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.").
24. Id. § 201(d)(2).
25. Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Under
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) of Action Involving Breach of Contract Concerning Copyright, 119
A.L.R. FED. 471, 477 (1994) ("Copyrights are often the subject of agreements, usually a
license or assignment agreement by which copyright owners license others to use their copy-
rights or otherwise assign some ownership interest in the copyrights.").
26. E.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011)
("[C]opyright owners may create licensing arrangements so that users acquire only a license
to use the [property] and do not acquire title that permits further transfer or sale of that [prop-
erty] without the permission of the copyright owner.").
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license, you need a contract, and state law governs contracts. 27 Because con-
tract law is state specific, there is no single "contract policy," but rather,
fifty individual policies. In many respects, however, most state policies are
in general accord, if not in perfect agreement.28 Relevant state contract poli-
cies29 include interpreting contracts against the drafter ° and interpreting
31contract clauses as covenants rather than conditions.
The notion that contracts should be construed against the drafter is
straightforward. The rationale behind this rule is that people who draft con-
tracts will pay more attention to their own interests than to the interests of
any other parties.32 This rule is especially strong in cases involving adhesion
contracts or disparity in bargaining power.33
The policy of preferring a covenant interpretation over a condition in-
terpretation, on the other hand, is more complex. A covenant is a legal
promise that something will or will not be done. 34 A condition is defined in
section 224 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as "an event, not cer-
tain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under a contract becomes due. ' ' 35 The important distinction
between the two terms is that performance by the other party is excused if a
condition of that performance is not fulfilled,36 whereas, if a covenant is
violated, no such excusal automatically occurs.37 Without excusal, of course,
the other party must still fulfill its side of the bargain.38
Conditions in contracts take one of two forms: express or construc-
tive.3 9 An express condition is written into the contract, whereas a construc-
tive condition is supplied by the court.40 Courts are often reluctant to find
27. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).
28. For the general consensus of state contract policies, see generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
29. There are, of course, a myriad of state contract policies. Others embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts include the duty of good faith and fair dealing, id. § 205,
interpretations favoring the public, id. § 207, disallowance of unconscionable terms, id. §
208, and the parol evidence rule, id. § 213, to name a few.
30. Id. § 206.
31. Id. § 227 ("Standards of Preference with Regard to Conditions").
32. See id. § 206 cmt. a.
33. Id.
34. E.g., Cedar Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 628 S.E.2d 284, 291 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2006) (citing 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 1 (2005))
("The word 'covenant' means to enter into a formal agreement, to bind oneself in contract,
and to make a stipulation.").
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224.
36. Id. § 225(1) ("Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due
unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.").
37. Id. § 227 cmt. b.
38. Id.
39. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 38.11-38.12 (4th ed. 2000).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226.
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that an ambiguous term is an express condition because finding that a party
breached an express condition releases the obligation of the other party
completely, likely leading to a greater loss by the obligee.41 As the Court of
Appeals of New York stated, "In determining whether a particular agree-
ment makes an event a condition courts will interpret doubtful language as
embodying a promise or constructive condition rather than an express condi-
tion. 42 Constructive conditions are less burdensome because substantial
compliance, as opposed to literal compliance, is sufficient.43
When applying a constructive condition, a court looks to whether the
party substantially complied with the contract, or whether the party breached
the contract so materially that the contract may be considered voided by the
action." Rescission of a contract is a drastic remedy because it completely
nullifies the contract.45
Contract rescission involves some of the most difficult contract policy
questions. All the normal contract guidelines apply,46 but in addition, the
court is asked to impose its after-the-fact judgment and nullify the agree-
ment. The question of whether a court should impose itself in this manner is
tightly interwoven with the state's policies underlying the ability to contract.
Though rescission is granted relatively rarely, it is certainly a valid remedy.
Rescission issues may arise in a copyright license case when a plaintiff sues
for infringement because the defendant allegedly either (a) failed to fulfill an
expression condition or (b) breached the contract so materially that the con-
tract that licensed the copyright usage may no longer be controlling.47
Though difficult enough alone, rescission is not the only complex issue that
surfaces when dealing with contracts and intellectual property.
41. Id. § 227 cmt. b.
42. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415,418 (N.Y.
1995).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, 971 F.2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 349 (2d Cir. 2000) (courts
must sometimes determine "whether the breach is so material as to create a right of rescis-
sion") (The Second Circuit effectively overruled Schoeberg on other grounds in Bassett).
45. See Jobim v. Songs of Universal, Inc., 732 F. Supp.2d 407, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(citing Nolan v. Sam Fox Publ'g Co., 499 F.2d 1394, 1397 (2d Cir. 1974)) ("[R]escission of a
contract is an extraordinary remedy ... ").
46. Examples of normal contract guidelines include capacity, consideration, signature,
writing, and evidence.
47. See, e.g., Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932-33.
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3. Breach of Contract vs. Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights
a. Scope of the license
Licenses allow copyrights to be used in specific ways by entities other
than the copyright holder. When the copyright holder alleges that the licen-
see misused the copyright, the question becomes whether the action is a
breach of contract or an infringement of the underlying intellectual property
rights.48 Because the scope of the license governs what uses are appropriate,
the principal issue in resolving this question is the scope of the license. Does
the contract cover the right and the alleged breach? Is the breach that of a
condition or a contractual covenant? Does the case involve a construction of
the Copyright Act? And does the federal policy of construing copyright dis-
putes in favor of the copyright owner govern? Each of these questions
should be handled separately so that all of the relevant considerations are
given appropriate weight and are discussed in the proper sequence.
The easiest cases concern license duration. These matters are resolved
easily by noting that, regardless of what the license may have covered, the
license has expired, so there is no controlling contract whose scope need be
further determined.49 There is no license, so any infraction would be a copy-
right infringement."
Once there is a determination that the license exists, the burden is on
the owner to show that the licensee's actions were unauthorized.5 The limi-
tations on the scope of the license often revolve around whether the breach
was of a covenant or a condition.5 2 If the licensee failed to satisfy a condi-
tion, the licensee's action falls outside the scope of permitted use allowed by
the license and constitutes an infringement.53 On the other hand, if the licen-
see merely breached a covenant, the scope of the license covers the licen-
48. See, e.g., id.
49. Gerig v. Krause Publ'ns, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (1999) (citing Schoenberg
v. Shapolsky Publishers, 971 F.2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated by Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 349 (2d Cir. 2000)) (The Second Circuit effec-
tively overruled Schoeberg on other grounds in Bassett).
50. Id.
51. Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen the contested issue is
the scope of a license, rather than the existence of one, the copyright owner bears the burden
of proving that the defendant's copying was unauthorized under the license .... ")
52. Id. (noting that this argument turns, as well as fails, "on the distinction in contract
between a condition and a covenant").
53. Id. See also, e.g., Costello Publ'g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1044 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ( "[I]f Talbot Press failed to satisfy a condition to its license ... , it had no rights under
which Costello can take cover and therefore both Talbot Press and Costello acted without
authority and thereby infringed defendant-intervenors' copyright.").
20121
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see's action, and the proper claim is probably in contract, not copyright. 4
State contract law prefers covenants to conditions when interpreting con-
tracts.55 In the context of copyright licenses, this preference will favor the
licensee, not the copyright owner.56 It makes sense to place the burden of
proving the licensee's actions were unauthorized on the copyright owner
bringing suit, but this is slightly inconsistent with the federal rule that favors
an owner by saying he keeps what he does not explicitly alienate.57
Returning to the Pat Author scenario, suppose her contract with Joe
Agent said, "It is a condition of Joe Agent's license to the copyright that Joe
Agent negotiates exclusively with Sarah Editor." If Joe Agent negotiates
with publisher Z, Joe violates the condition. If, on the other hand, her con-
tract said, on page twenty-five of a forty-page document, that eleven-point
Times New Roman font would be used in press releases, but Joe used ten-
point Arial font, he merely violated a covenant, and the copyright usage is
still within the scope of the license. This scope determination does not end
the analysis as the breach could be material enough to allow a rescission, but
that question arises only after the scope question is decided.5 8
b. Federal policy vs. state policy
State contract law concerning covenants and conditions is clear. Unfor-
tunately, determining whether a term is a covenant or a condition only be-
gins the analysis. Moving forward, it becomes difficult to determine what
law applies and to predict what a court will do. For example, if state contract
law is at odds with federal copyright policy, this conflict creates ambiguity.
54. Graham, 144 F.3d at 236-37 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15[A], at 10-120 (1998) ("'If the [licensee's] improper conduct
constitutes a breach of a covenant undertaken by the [licensee] . . . and if such covenant con-
stitutes an enforceable contractual obligation, then the [licensor] will have a cause of action
for breach of contract,' not copyright infringement.").
55. See, e.g., id. at 237 (citing Grand Union Co. v. Cord Meyer Dev. Co., 761 F.2d 141,
147 (2d Cir. 1985); Warth v. Greif, 121 A.D. 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)) ("Generally speak-
ing, New York respects a presumption that terms of a contract are covenants rather than
conditions."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981) ("Standards of
Preference with Regard to Conditions").
56. The presumption that terms in the contract are covenants limits the licensor's reme-
dies. Initially, the licensee is favored because the licensor must prove the terms of the con-
tract were, in fact, breached.
57. To review the federal policy favoring copyright owners, see, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. See, e.g., Graham, 144 F.3d at 237 (citing Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580,
586 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A material breach of a covenant will allow the licensor to rescind the
license and hold the licensee liable for infringement for uses of the work thereafter.").
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Copyright licenses "must be construed in accordance with the purposes
underlying federal copyright law."59 The most important federal copyright
policy, in this situation, is protecting the rights of authors. 6° This policy pre-
empts state contract interpretation rules such as "construing against the
drafter,"6' thus changing the way copyright contracts are construed in every
state. As a result, federal judges must give an aggressive interpretation to a
federal policy and thereby preempt the unanimous state consensus on con-
tract interpretation. 62 Following this approach would perhaps be more palat-
able if judges consistently applied a well-known and favorably treated rule.
This comment suggests a possibility for such a rule.63
The final path plaintiffs can follow to reach copyright protection under
the federal law, even if the actions are merely breaches of contractual cove-
nants, is rescission determined via the material breach/substantial perform-
ance analysis.64 This path, like the one through an expired contract or a
failed condition, renders the contract a virtual nullity, and obviously a null
contract cannot control the assignment of a copyright.65
4. Bringing It All Together: A Case Study
A detailed study of the most relevant recent copyright license case and
a discussion of this analysis at length is helpful to pull together the various
strands of substantive law set forth in the three previous sections. Sun Mi-
crosystems, Inc., v. Microsoft Corporation66 involved a conflict between two
of the largest software companies in the world concerning the viability of
the Java programming language on the Windows operating system-
arguably each company's most important program.67 Sun Microsystems,
59. S.O.S., Inc., 886 F.2d at 1088 (citing Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d




62. This policy had more teeth prior to eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize a pre-
sumption of irreparable harm in intellectual property cases. Id. at 391. Instead, the Court
applied the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief. Id. at 391-93. Though presump-
tions no longer apply, the federal policies still take precedence, including the preference for
protecting authors' rights.
63. See infra Part III.
64. See, e.g., Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998).
65. Rescission is defined as "a party's unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient
reason, such as the other party's material breach, or a judgment rescinding the contract."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
66. 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (an implied overruling on other grounds was recog-
nized by Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2011)).
67. Id. at 117.
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Inc., ("Sun") the developer and owner of the copyright to the open-source
programming language Java, granted Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") a
license to use Java and to write a virtual machine to run Java on Microsoft
Windows. 68 The agreement, which was "rushed," allowed both companies to
make improvements to the Java programming language.69 While the license
allowed Microsoft to make improvements, the language in the contract
stated that all improvements had to abide by certain restrictions, most im-
portantly that all improvements had to be backwards compatible with older
versions of Java.70
In most aspects, Microsoft's version operated quite well on the Win-
dows operating system, but the enhancements did not allow the Java Native
Interface-a core part of the Java language-to function properly.7' The
Microsoft version of Java also did not function properly on other operating
systems; this limitation went against one of the core purposes of Java, which
was to be platform independent.72
Sun sued Microsoft for copyright infringement and sought injunctions
to keep Microsoft from placing code in Java that was incompatible with
other operating systems.73 The first injunction Sun sought was to prevent
Microsoft from using the "Java Compatible" logo on Microsoft's products,
but a later-requested injunction included bans on distributing Internet Ex-
plorer and the Windows98 operating system unless the "products passed
Sun's compatibility tests. 74 Though Microsoft strongly maintained that its
activities were authorized by its license, the district court thought Sun was
likely to succeed on the merits of the lawsuit and therefore granted a pre-
liminary injunction.
The district court did not explain why it found that copyright remedies,
as opposed to contractual remedies, were appropriate, and Microsoft based
68. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (district court opinion).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1113-14.
71. Id. at 1115.
72. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1118. "Platform independent" means, in this
case, that Java could run on any mainstream operating system using any normal computer
hardware.
73. Id.at117.
74. Id. at 1118.
75. Id. at 1117. Later cases have altered this lax standard for granting injunctive relief to
include other elements, including the requirement of irreparable harm. See eBay, Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (applying traditional equitable principles to de-
termine whether injunctive relief is appropriate); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a presumption of irreparable harm when a plaintiff alleging copy-
right infringement is likely to succeed on the merits is "inconsistent with the principles of
equity set forth in eBay").
[Vol. 34
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES
most of its appeal on this distinction. 6 Microsoft contended that its actions
were, at most, breaches of contractual covenants, and the application of
copyright remedies to a breach of contract was therefore inappropriate."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary injunction
and remanded the case.7 8 It noted that, in order for copyright law to be im-
plicated, Sun had to prove, and the district court had to explicitly find, that
the conduct at issue constituted a failure on the part of Microsoft to satisfy a
contractual condition. 79 If the district court did not make this finding, copy-
right law would not govern, and Sun would not be entitled to a presumption
of irreparable harm.8" Accordingly, the court would be unlikely to grant an
injunction. s
The court recognized that it "should 'rely on state law to provide the
canons of contractual construction' provided that 'such rules do not interfere
with federal copyright law or policy,"' but did not further address the appli-
cability of state or federal law.82 The court also ignored the possibility that a
material breach of a covenant can create the right of rescission, leading to
another possible avenue for setting aside the contract.8 3
The Sun Microsystems, Inc. case discusses questions of contract scope,
copyright remedies, copyright policy, and state canons of construction as if
they were a single question. In doing so, the court appears to have decided
that the condition/covenant distinction was dispositive, giving short shrift to
all of the other issues, by implicitly limiting the district court's ability to
examine whether the breach in question was sufficiently material to allow
rescission of the contract and reinstatement of the injunction.
As comingled as the Sun Microsystems, Inc. reasoning was, the opinion
is probably the most straightforward discussion of these issues in any federal
appellate court to date. The lack of straightforward guidance for the decep-
tively complicated question of whether an alleged infraction is a breach of a
76. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1117.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1124.
79. Id. at 1122-23.
80. Id. at 1122. Again, this presumption of irreparable harm is no longer applicable.
Instead, a four-element test would be used. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7
(2008) (specifying that the four-element Winter test should be used in the Ninth Circuit)).
81. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1122-23.
82. Id. at 1122 (citing S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989)).
The question of applicable law is not addressed until the court determines whether there was
a breach of a condition or a covenant. Id.
83. It does not appear that this argument was presented on appeal. With the wide degree
of latitude that the court gave in its remand, however, such an argument might have merited
at least a footnote.
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contract or an infringement of the underlying copyright is matched by the
muddle in "arising under" jurisprudence.
B. Jurisdictional Issues - "Arising Under"
Though 28 U.S.C. § 1338 covers copyright matters, it is worthwhile to
first investigate the constitutional grant and general federal question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 before exploring § 1338's grant of specific
jurisdiction over copyright actions.
1. The Constitutional Grant and General Federal Question
Jurisdiction-Article III, § 2, Clause 1 and 28 U.S. C. § 1331
The Constitution states the federal judicial power "shall extend" to
cases and controversies "arising under" the laws of the United States. 84 The
"shall extend" language does not actually confer jurisdiction, but instead
sets the maximum jurisdiction that Congress can confer through legisla-
tion.85 The Constitution's "arising under" phrase potentially extends federal
jurisdiction to any case or controversy touching, to any extent, on a federal
law.86 During the nation's early years, the Supreme Court interpreted the
phrase very inclusively, to the furthest reasonable extent.87 Using this con-
stitutional authorization, Congress granted general federal question jurisdic-
tion to the federal judiciary with 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
The law concerning whether a case is one "arising under" a law of the
United States has a tortured history. In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall
gave the "arising under" clause, found in Article III of the Constitution, an
expansive reading, indicating that "the grant extended to every case in
which federal law furnished a necessary ingredient of the claim even though
this was antecedent and uncontested."88 Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court
84. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1.
85. Rory Ryan, It's Just Not Worth Searching for Welcome Mats with a Kaleidoscope
and a Broken Compass, 75 TENN. L. REV. 659, 663 (2008) (citing Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845)).
86. See, e.g., Osbom v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824).
87. See id. Because there was no statutory grant, however, federal courts did not have
original jurisdiction, and these early Supreme Court decisions concerned appeals. Because
the question here is the possible scope of the constitutional grant when it uses the language
"arising under," whether the procedural posture of the case was that of an appeal or an origi-
nal action is immaterial.
88. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing Osborn, 22
U.S. at 822-827). The jurisdictional "grant" mentioned here is that of appellate review, but,
again, that distinction is immaterial to the discussion of the scope of "arising under."
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showed that it interpreted the "arising under" language of "statutes defining
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts" more narrowly.89 By 1850, in a
case interpreting § 1338's specific grant of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court determined it had no jurisdiction over a patent contract case where the
patent was the subject matter of the contract, but no intellectual property
claim was made. 90 This movement away from extreme inclusion continued,
and early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had come close to
fully adopting the well-pleaded complaint rule. In 1914, Justice Van Devan-
ter explained that it had "become firmly settled that whether a case is one
arising under the Constitution or a law.., of the United States... must be
determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiffs statement of his
own claim. . . ,unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of
defenses."91
The winnowing away of the broad jurisdictional mandate is also appar-
ent in the distinction between cases and questions. The Supreme Court of
the United States has long held that there is a "clear distinction" between a
case arising under federal intellectual property law and one merely involv-
ing a "question" of federal law.92 If the complaint sets out a federal ground
for recovery, federal courts have jurisdiction.93 If, however, a question of
federal law appears only in the answer or testimony, then "[t]he determina-
tion of such question is not beyond the competency of the state tribunals." 94
The Supreme Court's commentary on "arising under" jurisprudence did
not end with Taylor, however. Within seven years of the Taylor decision,
Justice Holmes-part of the majority in Taylor-authored the dissenting
opinion in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.95 There, Justice Holmes
noted that "a suit cannot be said to arise under any other law than that which
creates the cause of action." 96
The Supreme Court further explained in Grable & Sons Metal Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing that a federal claim in-
cluded within a well-pleaded complaint, though always sufficient for federal
jurisdiction, is not strictly necessary.97 The Grable & Sons Court ultimately
89. Id. (citing Romero v. Int'l Terminal Opening Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959).
90. Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1850). This comment often provides exam-
ples from patent cases as well as copyright cases because (a) the exclusive jurisdiction statute
covers both patents and copyrights, (b) patent law is frequently applied in the copyright
arena, and (c) the differences in copyrights and patents are not implicated by the jurisdic-
tional and choice of law issues addressed in this comment.
91. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914).
92. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 255 U.S. 180, 213 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 214 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
97. 545 U.S. 308, 317 (2005).
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
held that federal courts could hear cases which, on their face, arise from a
state-law claim, so long as it is apparent "from the [complaint] that the right
to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law].'98
Grable & Sons is the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
"arising under" interpretations, and the Court brought together two types of
§ 1331 jurisdictional pathways in its opinion.99 The first type is merely a
restatement of Justice Holmes's well-pleaded complaint formulation: If a
plaintiff's complaint contains a claim based on a federal law, and if the issue
is raised in the "well-pleaded" portion of the complaint (not in, for instance,
any counterclaims or rebuttals to foreseen defenses), then the complaint
should be heard in federal court. 00 The vast majority of federal question
cases fall into this category.' The second type of jurisdictional pathway
discussed in Grable & Sons allows federal courts to decide cases that appear
on their faces to spring from state law but actually turn on a substantial
question of federal law. 10 2 This exercise of jurisdiction has been held proper
because it "captures the commonsense notion" that the necessity of deciding
"substantial questions of federal law . . . justif[ies] resort to the experience,
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal is-
sues."'
103
Federal courts, however, should be cautious before asserting jurisdic-
tion in cases involving state claims that only tangentially involve questions
of federal law. Even if it might initially appear to be beneficial to resort to a
federal forum, courts must further investigate whether such a usurpation of a
state claim disturbs "any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities."' '° Caution is mandated in part because exer-
cising this type of jurisdiction too frequently could shift an enormous vol-
ume of "traditionally state cases into federal courts."'0 5 Accordingly, courts
should only take cases that "would not materially affect, or threaten to af-
fect, the normal currents of litigation."'0 6
98. See id. at 312-13 (quoting Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180,
199 (1921)).
99. Id. at 312-313.
100. See id. at 312; Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914).
101. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 ("This provision for federal-question jurisdiction is
invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law ... .
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 313-14.




2. Specific and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Copyright Actions-
28 U.S.C. § 1338
Congress once again chose to use the "arising under" phrase in 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a), where it granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
copyrights. °7 One distinction between § 1331 and § 1338 is relevant here:
Section 1338's grant of exclusive federal court jurisdiction in copyright
cases. 108
Section 1338's grant of jurisdiction is important here because it is ex-
clusive.' Unlike general federal question jurisdiction, which allows the
state courts of general jurisdiction to resolve federal issues unless they are
removed to a federal forum, if a federal court can assert jurisdiction granted
under § 1338, the state courts cannot. If this use of the "arising under" lan-
guage is interpreted inclusively, like the Constitution and to a lesser extent
§1331, the statute removes the vast majority of copyright cases from state
courts. Alternatively, if "arising under" is interpreted more narrowly, the
statute allows state courts to handle more cases involving copyrights be-
cause access to a federal forum is restricted. That "either/or" logic is the
nature of exclusive jurisdiction. "0
Even more noticeable than the distinctions between the two statutory
grants, however, are the statutes' similarities. With the exception of the ex-
clusivity provision, Congress appears to have created a redundant statute by
enacting § 1338."' Every act of Congress is a law of the United States, so
§ 1331 had already granted the federal courts jurisdiction in every copyright
case. This "belt and suspenders" approach to jurisdictional grants will be
discussed in more detail below"2 in order to help resolve one of the more
potentially problematic aspects of the analysis proposed here.
107. 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to . . .copyrights. No State court shall have jurisdiction over
any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (2011).
108. Another distinction is the "Laws of the United States" language found in § 1331
compared to the "any Act of Congress" language in § 1338. The Supreme Court has held that
the grant under § 1331 covers all laws of the United States, including common law, adminis-
trative acts, treaties, and all other recognized sources of federal law. The copyright formula-
tion in § 1338, however, limits itself to Acts of Congress. This distinction has very little
practical impact because copyright law springs directly from Congress. Therefore, this osten-
sible difference will not be discussed further. There are, of course, other differences, includ-
ing the other types of intellectual property covered by § 1338.
109. § 1338(a).
110. This logic is based on a myopic view of § 1338(a) in isolation.
I 11. Technically, § 1338 was enacted prior to § 1331 (which Congress re-enacted in 1875
to give general federal question jurisdiction). Congress has had well over a century to change
the language, however, and it has neglected to take that opportunity.
112. See infra Part III.A.1.
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3. Jurisdiction in Copyright License Cases
Modem courts and commentators have yet to resolve the issue of how
to determine whether a claim arises under the federal copyright laws. This
issue "poses among the knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurispru-
dence." 3 Several modem cases have addressed the problem.
a. Justice Holmes's creation test
One of the first tests in "arises under" jurisprudence was Justice
Holmes's "creation test," which said that "[a] suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action.' 4 Essentially, under this test, if the claim as-
serted a right created by federal law, then federal law governed; if the claim
advanced a right afforded by state law, then the state's law governed, even if
the state law referred back to a federal law (such as patent or copyright
law)." '5 This placement of jurisdiction was proper even if the state law's
referral to federal law required an interpretation of federal law because the
state, as master of its own law, can decide what is a breach of contract in
whatever way it chooses, including by reference to external bodies of law.
116
b. Judge Friendly's three-part test
Much of the development in § 1338 "arising under" jurisprudence
thereafter occurred in the Second Circuit. Judge Friendly formulated a more
nuanced test with three possible pathways to federal jurisdiction: a well-
pleaded complaint, a construction of federal copyright law, or a controlling
federal policy.' By adding two additional paths to federal jurisdiction, this
rule is obviously more expansive than the well-pleaded complaint rule.
113. NIMMER, supra note 54, § 12.01[A], at 12-4.
114. Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). The "creation test" is the name
sometimes given to the manifestation of the well-pleaded complaint rule discussed supra.
115. Id. ("But whether it is a wrong or not depends upon the law of the state where the act
is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit arises under the law of the state.").
116. Id. ("The state is master of the whole matter, and if it saw fit to do away with actions
of this type altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose that they still could be maintained
under the patent laws of the United States.").
117. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964). Judge Friendly listed
the three possibilities for a claim arising under federal copyright law as follows:
Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area, we think that an action 'arises
under' the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the
Act ... or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at the very least and per-
haps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that fed-
eral principles control the disposition of the claim.
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Judge Friendly began by noting that the most extreme assertion-that
any claim involving copyrights in any way, including simply who owns the
copyright, arises under federal law-was a reasonable interpretation of §
1338, but the courts have rejected such a construction.' 1 8 Principles of feder-
alism and jurisdictional competence also discourage this extreme position;
States have strong interests and sophisticated institutional competence in
governing contracts created using their laws, and in those situations, there is
often trivial federal significance." 9 Regardless of the debate, it is well set-
tled that state courts can decide questions of copyright title as well as inter-
pret and apply contracts relating to copyrights. 2 0
Though Judge Friendly recognized the importance of allowing states to
decide contract issues, the Friendly test can be much more expansive than
Holmes's sparse creation test, 12 1 and it can implicate substantial federal is-
sues of statutory interpretation. In particular, the Friendly test grants federal
jurisdiction when an important federal policy is implicated even when there
are no federal remedies available. 122 This is true even where the claim itself
is expressly created by state law and does not implicate the Copyright Act.
23
The Friendly test's second pathway to federal jurisdiction was stated
vaguely. In at least some sense, every case involving copyrights requires a
degree of interpretation of the Copyright Act. Obviously, this expansive
118. See id. at 824. A four-corners approach to statutory interpretation would be ambigu-
ous, so it is important to look at how the statute has been used.
Simply as a matter of language, the statutory phrasing would not compel the conclusion that
an action to determine who owns a copyright does not arise under the Copyright Act, which
creates the federal copyright with an implied right to license and an explicit right to assign.
But the gloss afforded by history and good sense leads to that conclusion as to the complaint
in this case.
Id. at 825.
119. Id. at 826 ("Indeed, the case for an unexpansive reading of the provision conferring
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to patents and copyrights has been especially strong since
expansion would entail depriving the state courts of any jurisdiction over matters having so
little federal significance.").
120. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1912) (citing
Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624, 627 (1897)) ("The Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases arising under the patent laws, but not of all questions in which a patent may be
the subject-matter of the controversy. For courts of a State may try questions of title, and may
construe and enforce contracts relating to patents.").
121. Even if one were to assume that § 1331's general federal question test, see Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921), which is more expansive that the
creation test, was applicable in a § 1338 context, the Friendly test goes further still.
122. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827-28 ("For a new and dynamic doctrine ... instructs us
that even in the absence of express statute, federal law may govern what might seem an issue
of local law because the federal interest is dominant.").
123. Id. at 827 ("Having thus found that appropriate pleading of a pivotal question of
federal law may suffice to give federal jurisdiction even for a 'state-created' claim, we cannot
halt at questions hinging only on the language of the Copyright Act.").
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reading of Judge Friendly's formulation is overbroad. A more plausible
reading is that Judge Friendly was merely applying the Kansas City Title §
1331 exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule to the § 1338 context: A
particularly difficult interpretation of copyright law, especially those involv-
ing an issue of first impression, should be resolved in federal court.'24
The Eleventh Circuit used this pathway to exclusive federal jurisdiction
in Sullivan v. Naturalis.125 In Sullivan, the court was faced with the question
of whether an oral transfer of rights in copyrighted material is ever permit-
ted according to the Copyright Act. 26 Though this question of title would
normally be a contractual matter properly within the province of the state,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that this was exactly the sort of copyright law
interpretation that Judge Friendly had in mind when he articulated the sec-
ond prong of his test. 27 The court also noted that at least the Second, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits were in accord with this understanding of arising under
jurisprudence. 2 '
The third prong of the T.B. Harms test was recognized by Judge
Friendly himself as the weakest: A case arises under federal copyright law if
the complaint "at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case
where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control
the disposition of the claim."129 The reason this prong is "more doubtful"
and constitutes the weakest of the three prongs is because it applies only in
situations where a court finds a federal policy to be implicated but where no
federal claim was made, and no important or difficult interpretation of the
Copyright Act is required.
c. The Schoenberg test
In the early 1990's, the Second Circuit shifted focus from the com-
plaint itself to the essence of the contract and whether the copyright com-
prised a substantial portion of the complaint. 3° In Schoenberg v. Shapolsky
Publishers, the Second Circuit used a three-part analysis to determine when
124. See Kansas City Title, 255 U.S. at 199.
125. 5 F.3d 1410, 1413 (1 th Cir. 1993).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828).
128. Id. (citing Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987); Topolos v. Caldewey,
698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983); and RX Data Corp. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 685 F.2d 192 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
129. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (emphasis added).
130. See Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, 971 F.2d 926, 932 (2d Cir. 1992), abro-
gated by Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 352-55 (2d Cir. 2000).
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a claim arises under federal copyright law. 131 First, a court should decide if
the infringement claim is merely incidental to the plaintiff's overall claim; if
so, federal jurisdiction is improper.'3 2 Second, if the copyright claim is more
than merely incidental, the court should investigate whether the breach was
that of a condition or a covenant;133 if the breach was of a condition, federal
jurisdiction is proper. 34 Third, if a covenant was breached in a sufficiently
material manner to justify rescission, federal jurisdiction is proper.'35 Oth-
erwise, federal jurisdiction is improper.
36
"A [major] problem with the Schoenberg test is that it is vague."' 137 As
a result, the complainant cannot know whether to file suit in federal or state
court because jurisdiction can depend greatly on the defendant's answer . 38
For instance, the complaint might allege infringement and not even mention
a license, leaving the defendant to argue a license as an affirmative defense
before the plaintiff responds that the breach created a right of rescission.' 39
"A court examining such a complaint would have no idea whether the 'es-
sence' of plaintiffs claim would turn out to be a matter of contract, much
less whether plaintiffs 'real[ ] concern[ ]' lay in the infringement, or
whether plaintiff was 'more interested' in peaceful 'enjoy[ment of] his
property."" 4
Another troubling aspect of the Schoenberg test is that it forces the
court, as part of its decision to assert jurisdiction at the beginning of litiga-
tion, to make substantive determinations in the absence of a true understand-
ing of the case, which is revealed only after a trial.' 4 1 In many cases, the
Schoenberg test would require, at minimum, a hearing to determine proper
subject-matter jurisdiction; that hearing, by necessity, would have to solve
many of the questions of the trial prior to determining if subject-matter ju-
risdiction was proper. 42 Is the infringement claim really the "essence" of the
case? Is the claimed problem with a condition or a covenant? Is there a pos-
sibility of rescission? Under Schoenberg, all of these substantive questions
131. Id. at 932-33. This comment places the discussion of merits before the discussion of
jurisdiction in order to make this type of jurisdictional test understandable. As will be shown,
courts have been forced into the same reversed sequence to resolve cases.
132. Id. at 932.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 932-33.
136. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 933.
137. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 353 (2d Cir. 2000).
138. Id.






must be answered before a court can know if it has jurisdiction to hear the
case. 143
d. Stepping away from the Schoenberg test
Partially because of these problems, less than a decade after deciding
Schoenberg, the Second Circuit departed from Schoenberg's essence-of-the-
dispute test and returned to a stricter construction of the Friendly test.
144
That court noted that it had used an essence-of-the-dispute test prior to T.B.
Harms4 5 and decided that the Friendly test was still superior. 146 The primary
reason for reinstating the Friendly test was that, because federal courts enjoy
exclusive jurisdiction over federal copyright remedies, a decision that a
valid copyright claim was merely incidental effectively deprived plaintiffs
of all remedies afforded by the Copyright Act under Schoenberg.4 7 Plain-
tiffs with such claims would not have recourse to injunctions, statutory
damages, or attorney's fees.'48 Citing to T.B. Harms, the Second Circuit
ultimately returned to the well-pleaded complaint rule.' 9 Shortly after the
Second Circuit reinstated the well-pleaded complaint rule, the D.C. Circuit,
in Scandinavian Satellite Systems, AS v. Prime TV Limited, 50 examined the
holdings of sister circuits and could "find no better interpretation" of this
crucial portion of the Copyright Act than the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.5'
e. Problems with the other tests
A common worry associated with the well-pleaded complaint rule is
that there will be a deluge of non-meritorious federal complaints that state
courts could readily resolve. The Second Circuit, however, regarded this
criticism as "greatly exaggerated."' 5 2 The court explained that even if an
143. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354-55. The structure of this comment mirrors this oddity:
Copyright law sometimes requires courts to make extensive substantive determinations be-
fore deciding if jurisdiction is proper.
144. Id. at 352.
145. Id. at 347.
146. Id. at 349.
147. Id. at 348.
148. Id.
149. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.
1964)) ("When a complaint alleges a claim or seeks a remedy provided by the Copyright Act,
federal jurisdiction is properly invoked.").
150. 291 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 844.
152. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 350 n.4.
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"open the floodgates" problem occurred, the system has a built-in balance
against bad faith claimants: the court can refuse supplemental jurisdiction."3
Each of the tests discussed above (Holmes's creation test, Friendly's
test, and Schoenberg's essence-of-the-dispute test) has one or more prob-
lems that courts have been unable to resolve.154 The essence-of-the-dispute
test combines jurisdictional and merit-based analyses without taking into
account exclusive federal jurisdiction.155 Holmes's creation test and the
other versions of the well-pleaded complaint rule allow possibly non-
meritorious federal claims into federal courts.'56 The Friendly test also al-
lows nebulous "federal policy" to permit federal jurisdiction even when
there is no explicit federal claim or required federal interpretation. 5 7 Some
of these problems are unavoidable when dealing with these issues of split
sovereignty, but this comment will propose a straightforward path to under-
standing how complaints should be filed and why.
158
I1. ANALYSIS - HOW THE LAW SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED
The proper implementation of the law would allow courts to determine
jurisdiction before delving into the substantive issues of the case. If the
complaint alleges a cause of action created by copyright law, the case is
proper for federal jurisdiction under § 1338. If not, the court should use §
1331 's interest analysis to see if a significant interpretation of copyright law
is required and if the allocation of responsibilities between the state and
federal judiciaries would be best served by the choice of a federal forum. If
so, federal jurisdiction should be asserted; otherwise, federal jurisdiction is
not proper. The court that asserts jurisdiction will then hear the case and
determine which law is appropriate for proper disposition.
A. The Extent of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction in Copyright License Cases
One guiding policy for "arising under" questions is the requirement of
a remedy for the infringement of every legal right. " 9 The idea of a govern-
ment of laws depends upon this notion.' 6° A second guiding principle is that
exclusive jurisdiction combines the question of subject-matter jurisdiction
153. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006)).
154. See Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(A), 11 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART& ENT. L. & POL'Y 361,
393-94 (2001).
155. Id. at 394-95.
156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Part 11.B.3.b.
158. See infra Part III.




with the question of remedies: Subject matter jurisdiction is proper if, and
only if, a remedy supplied by the Copyright Act is sought for a right granted
by that Act.
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from the Copyright Act, the remedies available under the Act are only avail-
able in federal court. A federal court, therefore, should hear any complaint
that states such a claim. Tests that can grant state courts jurisdiction, includ-
ing tests that look to the "essence of the complaint," are improper when the
complaint alleges a federal claim.
The Friendly test, as further developed through Bassett 6' and Scandi-
navian, 16 is a good starting point because it takes into account the important
federal considerations. Did the plaintiff correctly ask for federal assistance
by requesting a remedy for a violated federal right? Is an interpretation of
the Copyright Act necessary? Is some other important federal copyright
policy implicated? The Friendly test only considers federal interests, how-
ever, and ignores the appropriate place of state law in this contractual prob-
lem.
1. A Consistent Approach
A more consistent approach will use both § 1331 and § 1338 to allow
both state and federal interests to be considered. Section 1338 should only
be used to cover the first prong of the Friendly test: the well-pleaded com-
plaint. Neither an interpretation of the copyright law, nor an important fed-
eral interest alone, should be sufficient to convey jurisdiction under § 1338.
The latter two jurisdictional prongs should be dropped from § 1338 cover-
age analysis due to the unpredictability that results when courts attempt to
combine exclusive jurisdiction with the inherent discretionary fuzziness that
arises when deciding a case that actually revolves around a substantial ques-
tion of federal law or policy. This narrower standard for § 1338 is consistent
with the rest of the statute, which limits the federal court jurisdiction of §
1331 to "Acts of Congress" related specifically to copyrights.
The latter two prongs of the Friendly test-the copyright-
interpretation-without-a-copyright-claim consideration and the federal-
interest-without-a-copyright-claim factor-will rarely be issues in practice
because generally a colorable claim for federal recovery is likely available
where a substantial federal issue involving the copyright law arises. In the
rare case where such an issue does arise, however, a federal court has no
161. 204 F.3d at 347-56.
162. 291 F.3d at 844-47.
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need to use the exclusive jurisdiction granted by § 1338.163 The court can
simply fall back to the more inclusive standard of § 1331 and justify assert-
ing jurisdiction by reference to that statute.
This fall-back approach uses the "belt and suspenders" nature of the
two statutes to avoid implying that state courts cannot hear cases regarding
questions of federal law. Exclusive jurisdiction simply does not apply with §
1331. The fact that this approach requires the courts to interpret the same
"arises under" phrase differently in very similar statutes should not be par-
ticularly worrisome, as the courts already interpret precisely the same phrase
differently when dealing with the Constitution than when dealing with acts
of Congress. 6 This approach simply extends such an interpretive trend a
step further, and in exchange, federal courts can use prudential concerns in
the normal § 1331 analysis.
165
If the second and third prongs of the Friendly test are rendered non-
exclusive, state courts may hear some claims that were once heard by fed-
eral courts. 166 Claims shifted to the state courts would include those filed by
attorneys who could not find a plausible federal copyright claim or, for some
other strategic reason, chose not to assert the claim in order to remain in
state court. These cases will then be decided on state law and contractual
issues. 67 Most moments of interpretation are questions, not cases, so the
second prong of the Friendly test can safely be made non-exclusive. 68 As
163. Again, this is problematic because § 1338's exclusive jurisdiction means that if a
federal court can assert jurisdiction, a state court cannot; the federal court is the exclusive
forum for the claim. The line for exclusive jurisdiction can be clearly drawn in cases consid-
ering well-pleaded complaints, but consistency is much more difficult to achieve when at-
tempting to draw the line in situations where a copyright claim in not asserted yet either
interpretation of federal copyright laws or consideration of compelling federal policy interests
is necessary.
164. Furthermore, this interpretation would prevent legal scholars and practitioners from
criticizing § 1338 as a mere redundancy to § 1331.
165. Though courts will balance in the same fashion whether they use § 1331 or § 1338,
jurisdictional decisions under § 1331 would not carry the baggage of "exclusivity" prece-
dence, thereby allowing courts to make more case-by-case determinations. Even if § 1331 is
deemed unnecessary to accomplish that goal, this comment suggests that copyright jurisdic-
tion questions should be resolved by using the Friendly test consistently.
166. The number of cases that would be shifted to state court is uncertain, however, be-
cause an interpretation of the Copyright Act will often lead to a plausible claim that a right
granted under the Act has been violated. If the claimant pleads as such, a federal court will
still hear the complaint.
167. The important nuances created by the Copyright Act are little different than other
foreign law interpretations that state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, routinely have to
answer.
168. Of course, state courts faced with federal questions should try to answer the ques-
tions as a federal court would, much as a federal court must do when faced with a state ques-
tion. For more information about this notion of split sovereignty in the United States, see the
discussion of the Erie Doctrine, infra, note 194 and accompanying text.
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noted above, the language "arises under" normally leaves "questions" in the
capable hands of courts of other jurisdictions.
2. Potential Problems with the Recommended Approach
One concern with the well-pleaded complaint rule is that plaintiffs will
abuse the rule by bringing cases into federal court through claims that are
non-meritorious. 169 Though there are several mechanisms already in place to
prevent this abuse, 7' the courts could also adopt a policy under which, bar-
ring exceptional circumstances, federal courts decline to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over a claim if it is determined that the case presents no
copyright issues.17 1 Courts might also be more willing to impose sanctions
for frivolous forum shopping in these cases.
Another problem with following the well-pleaded complaint approach
is that it creates a level of formality that increases the chance a lawsuit will
be dismissed due to a technicality. In copyright cases, however, the parties
will often be sophisticated corporate actors. 72 For business reasons, these
parties would likely prefer the consistency and predictability of bright line
rules to the possibly fairer-but certainly more costly-fact-intensive
rules.
73
A less obvious problem is the insoluble dilemma of split sovereignty. A
well-pleaded complaint approach would require federal courts to resolve
some issues in which the states have much stronger interests than the federal
government. Federal courts are frequently called upon to interpret state law,
however, and Congress seemingly planned for the federal courts to be the
main forum for disputes involving copyrights. Therefore, this dilemma
stems directly from the statute and may actually be no dilemma at all. Es-
169. Whether this type of abuse is at all prevalent is uncertain. See Bassett v. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 350 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000).
170. Such mechanisms include pre-trial hearings to determine jurisdiction, sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and case dismissal with or without prejudice.
171. See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 350 n.4 ("This [built in check against non-meritorious
claims] is the risk that, once the federal court dismisses the copyright claim, it may decide to
refuse supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims."). This comment sug-
gests that federal courts should adopt a policy of refusing residual supplemental jurisdiction
unless the case has reached a juncture where such a refusal would be highly inefficient.
172. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that "two sophisticated parties have negotiated a copyright license and dispute
its scope").
173. If experience shows that this level of formality would be oppressive to non-corporate
copyright holders, Congress might decide to amend the statute to make distinctions between
the default rules that govern consumers and those that govern companies, much like similar
rules in the Uniform Commercial Code. Examples include sales contract modifications




sentially, federal courts will be required to hear some rescission claims and
state courts will be forced to decide some copyright questions. While im-
plementing a consistent, simple rule to handle the conflict when it arises
may seem problematic in theory, it remains straightforward in practice.
174
The distinction between "essence of the claim" approaches and well-
pleaded complaint approaches is perhaps most important in cases dealing
with claims to rescind the contract. The well-pleaded complaint approach
allows any plaintiff with a colorable claim for rescission to properly file in
federal court. Because materiality of a breach is fact intensive, it seems
likely that most plaintiffs would be able to make non-frivolous claims to
rescind, even if the main purpose of those claims was to forum shop. Al-
though federal courts frequently decide state law claims, especially in both
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases, rescission cases involve deci-
sions regarding whether to nullify agreements, arguably an important under-
lying principle of the state's contract policy.
Furthermore, the fact-intensive nature of rescission determinations
means these inquiries may require a great deal of the federal courts' time.
The "essence of the claim" tests exacerbate this problem, however, instead
of mitigating it. In applying the "essence of the claim" test federal courts
will spend the same amount of time resolving rescission claims, but the
claims will instead be addressed under the guise of a jurisdictional determi-
nation. If the federal court decides it does not have jurisdiction, a state court
may then have to go through the same analysis. Frivolous rescission claims
may create large inefficiencies either way, but with the well-pleaded com-
plaint test, the federal court will at least not have wasted its time investigat-
ing the claim.
B. Federal Copyright Law for Structure, State Contract Law for
Interpretation
Resolving the murky "arising under" issue presents a model for deter-
mining which court should hear the dispute, but it does not reveal whether
state or federal law should be applied or how to apply whichever law sur-
vives the conflict analysis. Copyright law should be the starting point, and if
federal and state law conflict, federal law must win.'75
174. A rule choosing the opposite court at times would only transfer the problems of one
court, acting outside its normal sphere of expertise, to another court. If a theoretical problem
would exist either way, a procedural solution may be the best option available.
175. Preemption is dictated by the Supremacy Clause: "This Constitution, and the Laws




1. An Overview of the Analysis
This comment suggests that the proper approach requires jurisdiction to
be decided without a deep investigation of the substantive issues. Once ju-
risdiction is decided, the court hearing the dispute should resolve the con-
flict of law issue and any remaining questions as follows: The court should
begin by determining what copyright right is at issue. 7 6 Next, the court
should ask if the contract covers that right. This question is determined by
federal law, which says that ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the
copyright owner, and rights not granted by the copyright owner are retained.
If the right is not covered by the contract, potential copyright infringement is
at issue and copyright law governs. 177 Alternatively, if the right is covered
by the contract, the court should continue its analysis, following state con-
tract rules. State law mandates, inter alia, that ambiguities should be con-
strued against the drafter.
The court's analysis should continue using state law by looking next to
see whether a condition or merely a contractual covenant was violated. If the
violation was that of a condition, copyright law governs because the plain-
tiff's obligation to allow use of the copyright no longer applies, and the use
of the copyright was unauthorized. On the other hand, if the violation was
that of a covenant, the court should determine if the breach is sufficiently
material such that rescission is appropriate. State contract law generally
governs this determination, but if the breach is found to be egregious, copy-
right law reasserts itself. Whichever court asserted jurisdiction should then
decide the case based on the law the preceding analysis showed was appli-
cable.'
Note that this analysis allows both federal and state laws, and the inter-
ests underpinning those laws, to play important roles. If there is ambiguity
regarding whether a contract actually covers a right, the federal policy of the
copyright owner keeping what he does not explicitly alienate should govern
(construe ambiguities concerning whether the contract discusses the right in
question in favor of the copyright owner). Once the court determines that the
contract discusses the right, it should look to state rules in order to interpret
176. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing the exclusive rights afforded to a copy-
right owner).
177. A Schoenberg-type approach would not resolve the issue of jurisdiction until this
point because only now can it be said definitively that this case arises under the Copyright
Act. Of course, if the right was covered by the contract, the Schoenberg test would require
courts to continue searching for jurisdiction.
178. To clarify the distinction between this analysis and a Schoenberg analysis, under
Schoenberg, a federal court would only determine whether it had jurisdiction after it has
made all of the evidentiary findings necessary to resolve the condition/covenant distinction
and the question of rescission. Then, if there were no remaining federal questions, the court
would dismiss the claim, as it never had jurisdiction in the first place.
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what the contract does.'79 If the contract does not mention the right, it is
reserved; if the contract discusses the right, the contract governs.
2. Federal Law for Definitions, Requirements, and Default Rules
A closer look at the analysis will help clarify the recommended ap-
proach. The Supremacy Clause allows federal law to preempt state law, but
Congress often chooses to let the state govern the traditional provinces of
the state. 80 By nature, copyright licenses combine federal copyright law
with state contract law, so it is unsurprising that Congress would expect an
intermingling of the two areas of law. Federal copyright law serves to define
the parameters of a copyright license: what a copyright is,' which rights a
copyright grants,'82 how to determine if a specific right is in a contract,
183
and what remedies are available for infringement.'84
One important issue frequently argued in copyright litigation is the
scope of an existing license.'85 This issue is important because a license can
only control a situation if the scope of the license encompasses the action
that was an alleged infringement. The Copyright Act gives clear statutory
definitions regarding the rights that exist and, therefore, what can be li-
censed. 86 This explicit direction allows a court to confidently discern
whether a specific license covers a particular right. Federal law directs that
the copyright owner retains any rights not addressed by the contract. At this
point in the analysis, this federal rule trumps state rules such as the notion
that contracts should be construed against the drafter.'87
179. This approach allows the federal law to function similar to default rules in other
areas of law, such as various rule formulations under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act of 2006, or the Uniform Commercial Code's extensive set of default rules.
These rules include contract modification and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability,
discussed supra, note 173, as well as various commercial paper rules in Article 4.
180. For example, family matters, property, estate and inheritance, public health, and
corporations are typically governed by state law.
181. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2006).
182. Id. §§ 106-106A.
183. This investigation will include the specific state's case law, but one federal policy
that must be considered is that the copyright owner keeps the rights that the owner does not
explicitly license.
184. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-513.
185. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday,
Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
186. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A. Limitations and exclusions are listed in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-
122.
187. This important state contract policy has its place in copyright licenses, as will be-
come more apparent in the next subsection, infra Part III.B.3.
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The default rule, then, is that a right is retained unless it is expressly
granted. A federal court can read a copyright license in concert with 17
U.S.C. § 106 to determine if the license covers the right, construing any
ambiguity as to coverage itself in favor of the copyright owner. This most
important step should be governed entirely by federal law, and it need make
no allusion to the specific state's contract interpretation rules-those rules
are preempted.
3. State Contract Law for Interpreting the Contract
If the court determines that the allegedly infringed right is covered by
the contract, the federal structure takes a back seat to state contract law. Be-
cause the parties in this situation intended to describe the method for licens-
ing this right by reference to the state's contract law, it is entirely appropri-
ate to use that body of law in interpreting the contract. 188
On its face, the preference for covenant interpretations over condition
interpretations directly conflicts with the federal policy that favors copyright
owners. In practice, however, this preference for covenants is well under-
stood by both courts and attorneys drafting contracts, so copyright owners
can have more predictable licenses and lawsuits, and this foreseeability
leads to lower transaction costs.
Another important implication of using state contract law is that any
remaining ambiguities will be construed against the drafter, even if the
drafter is the owner of the copyright. This rule of interpretation, like the one
favoring covenants over conditions, is pervasive. 189 Businesses are the most
common owners of licensed copyrights, and these sophisticated drafters are
well situated to write contracts that meet their needs. The same policies that
have encouraged courts throughout the nation to interpret contracts against
the drafter apply to copyright licenses.
Using the mature body of state contract law for construction will
greatly diminish questions related to drafting and interpreting copyright li-
censes. This advantage is especially apparent when viewed in light of the
impossibility for a state to develop a tradition managing how its laws inter-
act with federal rules in an area where state courts are forbidden to tread.
Without such a tradition, there can be no state court guidance for a federal
court when interpreting a contract.
Following this approach would create a copyright version of the Erie
doctrine.' 90 This new doctrine will lessen the perceived value of forum
188. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988).
189. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
190. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie overturned the longstanding
rule from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which allowed federal judges to use federal com-
mon law when deciding diversity jurisdiction cases. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80. The Erie doc-
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shopping in exactly the same fashion as the original Erie doctrine, resulting
in consistency between state and federal interpretations of a single contract.
The similarity in rules will hopefully create a greater similarity in outcomes,
which in turn may further reduce the oft-predicted deluge of non-
meritorious cases that the bright line of the well-pleaded complaint rule
creates.
IV. CONCLUSION
The approach this comment recommends is the best way to merge
seemingly disparate interpretations and give courts, attorneys, and busi-
nesses a straightforward, principled way to traverse the briar patch that is
copyright license jurisprudence. This analysis gives federal law its rightful
precedence over state law yet also gives weight to Congress's recognition of
the important state contractual interests. The federal policy of favoring
copyright owners still gives a structure to copyright licenses, but the state
interest in controlling contracts made using state law provides a mature and
well-defined method of interpretation.
Because sophisticated parties usually draft copyright licenses, any for-
mal burdens spawned by the creation of bright line rules will generally be
outweighed by the business advantages of predictability and consistency.
The formality of a well-pleaded complaint in federal litigation is not a novel
suggestion, and it has been the core of each "arises under" test since the
nineteenth century. Indeed, following any different formulation would re-
quire highly persuasive reasoning. The "arises under" analysis suggested
here, then, is hardly controversial.
The second part of the analysis unravels a tangle of case and statutory
law, complicated by the competing policies of federal and state interests,
and shows how this muddle can best be understood. Federal law governs in
the structure and definition pertaining to how copyright licenses should be
crafted, most importantly with regard to what rights are covered and how the
contract must be read in favor of the copyright owner when interpreting
coverage. Once the threshold question addressing the rights covered by the
contract is resolved, federal law is tentatively satisfied, and state contractual
laws take over. At this point, the bias favoring the copyright owner no
trine abolished general federal common law, and it held that federal judges must defer to the
substantive state law, including the state's common law, when deciding disputes arising from
state claims:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal




longer applies, but instead the normal state interpretation rules govern, in-
cluding (a) the rule favoring covenant to condition interpretations and (b)
the rule interpreting ambiguity against the drafter.
This approach to copyright license cases explains the results many
courts have reached, though many times both the result and the analysis
appeared difficult to reconcile with other, seemingly similar cases. Some
courts have reached different conclusions, but the approach suggested in this
comment takes into consideration the laws, policies, and interests that drove
those decisions, even if different results would have been reached.
If the approach suggested by this comment is followed, attorneys will
most likely find it easier to draft contracts and file complaints, judges will
likely find it easier to interpret those contracts, and clients will undoubtedly
appreciate the increased certainty and predictability. Copyright license juris-
prudence will finally make sense.
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